The BaSotho War of the Gun, also known as the Sotho Gun War, is a true David vs Goliath story. In this story, a small mountain kingdom stands up against the might of the Cape colonial government and wins. They were not fighting for land, traditions, or national pride. Instead, they fought for something that should make every freedom-loving person sit up and pay attention: they were fighting for their right to own firearms.
Introduction
Prior to the BaSotho War of the Gun, the BaSotho (Sotho) were a people that inhabited the Drakensberg mountains and the low-lying regions of the eastern Free State. The expanding Orange Free State would come into contact and conflict with the Sotho over these eastern lands in the 1860s. The results were a series of very bruising wars that severely damaged the Sotho nation. The OFS Boers were not all that eager to try and assault the Sotho mountain fortress, and settled with the land they had acquired.
The Sotho king, Moshoeshoe, only gained peace and respite when he pleaded to the British to grant protectorate status to the kingdom. The British colonial government in London agreed in 1868, and this provided the Sotho with much needed security against the OFS. Basutoland would be annexed to the Cape in 1871, but later became a separate Crown Colony with direct rule from London in 1884. The High Commissioner of the Cape would possess legislative and executive powers for this new Crown Colony.
The Sotho were fiercely loyal to the British Crown and their ‘great white queen’ in London. Historians regularly describe their loyalty as being among the highest of her majesty’s subjects, and similar to the Mfengu, they were deeply grateful to the colonial government. Their first reason was that the British crown offered them a strong degree of security against the OFS Boers, while the other was that they were permitted to enjoy the fruits of the colonial economy. They were subject to colonial laws, but otherwise allowed to ‘civilise’ on their own timetable: gradually and slowly.
They quickly integrated into the colonial economy and developed a hunger for modern western living: pots, pans, ploughs, and firearms. Their love for firearms predated the British takeover, and King Moshoeshoe learned great lessons from the wars with the OFS. He made a determined effort to build a modern Sotho army, highly proficient in firearm use. Sotho men developed a reputation as expert marksmen, and the Sotho even learned to be effective mounted armed cavalry. Ostensibly for defence against the OFS in a worst-case scenario, they quickly answered any call for assistance by their great English Queen.
The Sotho got their firearms from the wages earned through their labour on the diamond fields. They brought these back to Basutoland on their return and steadily built-up Sotho firearm stockpiles. Even though the Sotho quickly developed an intense love and pride in their firearms, their ‘labour bring backs’ also included pots and ploughs. These more mundane items even outweighed their firearm acquisitions, but did not undermine the meaning firearms gave them.
Confederation and paternalism
The Confederation Project (read about it here) would touch nearly every part of colonial South Africa, and Basutoland was no different. Following the destructive Cape Frontier War of 1877 in which the Xhosa were totally defeated, with a significant degree of permanence (more here), it was the Sotho’s turn. The Confederation Project and Frontier Wars had brought the importance of black disarmament into close alignment. The general sentiment was very demeaning and highly paternalistic: black people with firearms made them do stupid and unwise things.
The ‘logic’ was so demeaning that colonial blacks were even likened to children, by saying ‘when a child hurts themselves with a knife, the parent takes the knife away to protect the child’. This logic denied any sense of intelligence or agency to blacks, as it meant that ‘they did not intend to be rebellious, but the firearm put silly ideas into their heads’. This is not a paraphrase of the general sentiment. Cape Prime Minister Gordon Sprigg used more or less these exact words.
The broader context was that firearms emboldened blacks to do unwise things, and this was why there was so much conflict in the country. High Commissioner Frere (also the Cape governor) also disliked the public carrying of firearms in a general sense. He did not like it even when whites carried firearms in public, because it was ‘a sign of an uncivilised people’. The government was the guarantor of peace and security, and this meant that firearm ownership had to be discouraged. To allow public carry of firearms was a sign that people doubted the government’s ability to protect them, and this could not be allowed.
The aftermath of the 1877 Cape Frontier War saw the creation of the Peace Preservation Act of 1878 (PPA). This law was used to completely disarm blacks in the Cape colony, including black groups with a track record of loyalty and honesty (such as the Mfengu). The Xhosa were easily disarmed and justified following their defeat because they were a hostile force. More tact was needed for groups such as the Mfengu, and the government decided to manipulate them.
The government simply told the Mfengu (and similar) that they were being disarmed for their own good. When they protested, the government asked them whether they were loyal to the British and Cape government. They of course said that they were, and the government then told them that it would be a sign of loyalty if they voluntarily disarmed. If they refused, this would be a sign of disloyalty. These groups wanted to be seen to be ‘loyal’, and so they disarmed.
Sotho and loyalty
The Sotho were another matter entirely. Even though the Mfengu and similar also liked their firearms (they were symbols of modernity, self-reliance, and even identity), the Sotho took this to a whole new level. It was made more complicated by the fact that the Sotho were very skilled diplomats, and not easy to manipulate. Disarmament felt like a punishment to the Sotho, which meant that they had done something to offend the Queen or the government.
The Sotho were very happy to suffer punishment for their wrongs, but only if they had actually done something wrong. They demanded that Sprigg tell them what they had done wrong to deserve being punished with disarmament. Of course, the Sotho had not done anything wrong. Some of their leaders even began to figure out what was really going on in Sprigg and Frere’s minds: the Sotho were black. Their crime was being black. They argued and debated with Sprigg, who had travelled all the way to Basutoland to personally try and argue with them. Sprigg was resolute: firearms made black minds do stupid things, and the only way to achieve peace in South Africa was to disarm all blacks.
There was also evidence that the Sotho were serious about being willing to disarm if they could be justly accused of something. A group of Sotho men were accused of fighting (with firearms!) in 1877 and summoned to appear before a local magistrate. The Thlotsi magistrate read out the charges against them, and they all immediately pleaded guilty. Their punishment was a £2 fine for each of them, and confiscation of their firearms for three months. They all paid their fines, and placed their firearms on the courtroom floor to be labelled, and left.
Another problem was that the Sotho directly linked their firearms with their loyalty the Queen in London. They did understand how they could serve their great Queen without their firearms. This was further complicated by the fact that Sprigg had completely misunderstood the social contract between Sotho and Queen and colonial government. The Sotho had personal loyalty to the Queen, and the Queen had not asked them to disarm. Instead, Sprigg had asked them.
Sprigg had expected a personal transfer of loyalty from the Queen to him, because he was a representative of the Queen. The Sotho did not see it this way. To make matters even more complicated, property ownership was a hallmark of the early colonial model. The Sotho were completely unprepared for this new model where the government could just expropriate property whenever it wanted. Even Cecil Rhodes was surprised by Sprigg’s arrogance and criticised the Cape government, and Cape and Basuto magistrates detested the PPA. These magistrates did not believe firearms made the Sotho more rebellious. Even Xhosa rebellion was not caused by firearms, but complex social, economic, and political variables.
A race to the bottom
The Sotho were able to see right through the government’s ‘arguments’, and realised that their loyalty did not matter: it was essential that they be disarmed. The die was cast, and Frere began to put the disarmament process in motion. The disaster of Isandlwana had also just occurred by 1879, and Frere was deeply embarrassed. Further, the Phuthi tribe (related to the Sotho through marriage arrangements) were led by the very independent-minded and also alienated chief of Moroosi. Moroosi felt emboldened by the British defeat at Isandlwana and rebelled.
Moroosi was besieged and ultimately defeated with Sotho help. His land (under the domain of paramount chief) was then alienated. The Sotho then began to get even more restless, because it had been promised that land under the paramount chief’s domain would never be alienated. Thanks to the skilled diplomacy of the Sotho, they were very able to manipulate policy-makers in London. The Aboriginal Protection Society in London started to lobby the British imperial government hard, who then began to scrutinise Sprigg’s government very closely. Generally speaking, London was also getting sick and tired of South Africa’s endless wars: if Sprigg caused a war, they would not come and help him.
Sprigg and Frere were unable to read the political winds. Even though field marshal Sir Garnet Wolseley even said he would not sent imperial troops, Sprigg thought that he would. Wolseley knew that the Cape did not have enough troops to fight a war. The Colonial Office in London also began to move away from Frere and warned him of not being cautious enough about disarmament. It did not matter. Frere sent his final arguments to the Colonial Office and proclaimed the PPA in Basutoland without waiting for a reply.
It immediately got off to a bad start. The only printing press in all of Basutoland was owned and operated by a French missionary who refused to print the proclamation. Some Sotho began to comply as word spread, but even more began to think of ways to rebel. Some preferred peaceful disobedience, others wanted to fight. Sotho society began to sharply divide over the issue between loyal and rebellious chiefs. Even the British magistrates in Basutoland were starting to argue with the Cape government: they hated the PPA and what it meant.
The Colonial Office rebuked Sprigg and Frere over alienating Moroosi’s land and fired him. London was very far away from the Cape, and so it trusted Sprigg to handle the situation appropriately. Unfortunately, Sprigg and Frere had already sown the seeds for a coming raging inferno. While Frere tried to desperately defend his tarnished reputation ruined by Isandlwana and now Basutoland, the situation in Basutoland exploded.
Sotho workers on the Kimberly diamond fields had anticipated trouble and simply downed tools and walked off work. They knew they had to get back to Basutoland as quickly as possible, and they brought yet more firearms with them. The loyal chiefs had also been attacked by rebellious chiefs and disarmed of firearms and dispossessed of their cattle. Basutoland magistrates ended up being besieged by hostile Sotho forces while others fled. Sprigg tried to arrange a meeting (pitso) with the Sotho to calm the situation, but only the loyal chiefs met with him and told him it was too late: Basutoland was in total uproar.
War makes interesting partners, and enterprising free-market Boers from the OFS began to supply the Sotho with firearms and ammunition to maintain their rebellion. The Cape mobilised its colonial troops who fought with the Sotho from February 1881, and by April 1881 the cost was becoming too much. Over 2,000 colonial troops were dead, over 8,000 Sotho were dead, and the Cape government treasury was almost bankrupt.
At a cost of £3 million pounds, the war was extremely expensive and the Sotho were still in near total control of Basutoland. By comparison, the total cost of all other wars in South Africa up to that point had a combined cost of around £2.7 million. The Anglo-Zulu War of 1878-1879 had only cost £135,000. The Cape parliament decided that enough was enough, and they passed a motion of no confidence in Sprigg. His replacement immediately began negotiating to end the war.
Conclusion
The conditions were simple: amnesty for rebels, restoration of the magistracies, a 5,000 cattle fine, and no disarmament. Firearms would be licensed, but not confiscated. Licences would be subject to the PPA, but the provisions would be applied very liberally. Basutoland would also go on achieve direct rule from London. It is not clear how much the Sotho actually complied with the conditions for peace, but the Cape was in no mood to try argue it. It is possible that had the Cape won the war, Basutoland would have become sufficiently incorporated into the Cape to be annexed to the Cape. Following 1910, there would be suggestions to annex, but London would decline this because of South Africa’s segregation and apartheid policies.